Constitutions are both written and signed by historical persons, physical bodies. But it is a peculiar form of authorship. The writing subject is hidden away; the third person neutral gives voice. Very quickly the message of the text assumes its own life, becoming perfectly readable without knowledge of the author. The Constitution is a gift circulating without the giver. The text gains in meaningfulness exactly in the absence of the author; the message it sends is absorbed as the intentionality evaporates into the general 'we'. In fact, constitutions, better than any other document, display all the features of that collective time-experience which Benedict Anderson recognized as lying at the heart of nationalism: progressive time, eternal time, secularizedsacred time, homogenous and 'empty', but brought together in an imagined community.
1 Its newness is formulated with respect to principles and values that are posited beyond time and space. God is replaced by People, hence its modern-ness; yet it is still a cosmogony, and it carries temporal-spatial transcendence within it. Constitutions can also therefore become salient reference points for social collective bodies at the level of identity, as the American experience documents so well: they bind together a populace across time and beyond social divisions.
Put differently, the very notion of constitution harbours a double meaning: first, it concerns a written document and the rule of law emanating from it; 2 second, it refers to a constitutive act that precedes the establishment of a political regime and constitutes a people as a political community. In the understanding of Thomas Paine, the American Constitution was an act not of government, but of a people constituting a government. 3 The constitution belongs to the social body; it is, in a sense, the social body declaring its own existence, emanating from the will of the people. The constitution is not only the skeleton of a political society; it is also its heart. The way it bespeaks itself into existence therefore matters.
Following Derrida, constitutions may be analysed as 'performative utterances'. Words become symbols within a symbolic matrix. The constitution is a speech act, and as such its language has effects far beyond the dissemination of what is right and wrong, what is a duty and what is a right: language performs and produces effects. Language becomes part of a world-making. Of course, the effectiveness and meaningfulness of discourse is contextdependent: not anyone can say the same words and bring about an effect. We can only 'do things with words', in philosopher J. L. Austin's phrase, 4 if we are placed in the right position at the right moment. 'I pronounce you man and wife', spoken at the end of wedding ceremony, has meaning and affect only if certain conditions are in place. Meaning is not attached in an intractable or permanent way to a particular set of signs, marks or sounds; it is brought about in a specific context, which is sociologically and historically bound. In Signature Event Context philosopher Jacques Derrida famously argued that this context-dependence is a constitutive feature of all utterances; that all contexts are themselves contingent. There are, Derrida maintains, only contexts 'without any centre or absolute anchoring'. 5 In fact, there is no 'con-text' that 'explains' the text: all we have are a series of texts which are themselves contingent. When we think to establish a 'con-text' we are in fact engaged in writing yet another text. We do not have to endorse all the epistemological consequences of Derrida's deconstructivist position to appreciate the point he makes, opening up 'grounding' texts such as constitutions or declarations of independences to a different kind of reading. Words do matter, and constitutions are indeed prime examples of political performativity, invested with an enormous load of symbolic power. From his more sociological perspective, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu insisted that the power of words is nothing but the delegated power of the speaker. 6 We therefore have to consider the social conditions for the effectiveness of ritual discourse. Taking a cue from ethnographer Arnold van Gennep, we may indeed go one step further and consider the writing of a constitution as part of a rite of passage. 7 Constitutions mark a transition. To be more precise: constitutions are the final outcomes of a ritual passage, its closing act. Where the neophyte in a 'tribal setting' going through a ritual passage to manhood has his new status stamped onto his physical body, shown and marked in front of his society which ritually recognizes his new identity as a man, 8 political societies have their new identity pinned down in the Constitution, closing the period of dramatic rupture and liminality that has typically preceded this phase of reintegration, as society is restored to the folds of a structuring order. 9 In fact, constitutions are often written in the aftermath of a war or some other dramatic upheaval, in the conscious attempt to reinstall order in a world of chaos and lost legitimacy. Constitutions blaze the trail from anti-structure to structure. Constitutions are key 'closure events' in rites of passage as gone through by large-scale societies. Using Bourdieu's terminology, constitutions are prime examples of those 'rites of institution', such as consecration rites, that bring about a change and simultaneously legitimize the very order they create. 10 To sum up: constitutions are decisive performance acts in a period of transition that they help to bring to a halt; in this process the Constitution shapes and moulds the new 'normality' which both annuls what existed before and renders explicit, meaningful, legitimate, functional and cosmologically cohesive what is to come. CONSTITUTING ITALY AT THE END OF WORLD WAR TWO Ever since its official birth moment, 1 January 1948, the Italian Constitution has remained a touchstone in Italian politics and society. Studied in public schools from an early age, the document has also assumed an immense cultural-patriotic significance. Whenever a political debate gets heated, participants will at some point invoke both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution to back up their own position or delegitimize that of the opponent. The 'founding fathers' of the Constitution are daily brought in play, in ways perhaps that they had not dared to envisage. Suggestions and attempts to rewrite the Constitution most often lead to nothing, not least because the Constitution itself laid down an extremely demanding revision process (Article 138). 11 The object of contention has always been part 2 of the Constitution (Organization of the Republic), not Part 1 (Rights and  Duties 12 In reality, with the Constitution Italy was exiting Mussolini's dictatorship and the document was drafted by Christian Democrats, Communists, Socialists, republicans, liberals and other small political forces joined in the spirit of anti-Fascism. Today, it is with very mixed feelings that Italians hear of centre-left Prime Minister Matteo Renzi's attempt to alter parts of the Constitution toward a higher degree of 'governability'. In fact, scepticism is in the air any time someone proposes to change the wording and the substance of the Italian Constitution. Somehow, it has gained an aura of sacrality. Touching any part of it, and especially the initial part which stipulates the founding principles of the Republic, easily appears as an attack on the precarious compromise it represents and defends, with the risk of opening up all the latent conflicts lurking beneath its protective umbrella. 13 This is no doubt because the writing of the Constitution did involve compromise between the viewpoints of its founding fathers so as to negotiate a settlement between the composite segments of the Italian population that had voted the members of the Constituent Assembly into power on 2 June 1946 -the day that gave birth to the Republic.
The aim of this article is simple. We want to assess the momentous turn in Italian politics signalled by the writing of the Constitution. Approaching the Italian constitution as a 'rite of passage', and as a 'performative utterance', there is one specific aspect of it that we would here like to focus on: the specific way in which the Italian citizen became symbolically 'coded' not as an 'individual', but as as a 'person', inspired by Catholic principles. What interests us here is less the legal dimension of citizenship, and less the social consequences of the formulations eventually adopted, but rather the underlying semantics and the wider symbolic universe that came to underpin those rules, trying to provide Italy not only with an institutional skeleton, but also a heart and spirit.
Our argument therefore rests on the assumption that what is at stake in the writing of a constitution is indeed the grounding of political legitimacy in a philosophical anthropology. As famously argued by philosopher Eric Voegelin in his interwar dispute with Hans Kelsen (probably the world's most famous constitutionalist ever), the political language adopted in constitutional writing must be understood as symbolic of ideological self-interpretation. In The Authoritarian State (1936), one of his most important Vienna publications, Voegelin fundamentally charged Kelsen with ignoring the content of human life, thus disregarding the necessary sociological and anthropological foundations of any political theory, and of similarly ignoring the question of preconstituted meaning. Relatedly, in his approach to the history of political thought, one of Voegelin's crucial methodological insights was that 'ideologies' had to be analysed as symbolizations of human experiences. 14 Here it must be remembered that the Italian Constitution was written in a real 'empty space', 15 with no foregone conclusions, in a historical figuration of quite radical contingency, which we have elsewhere conceptualized as a liminal moment. 16 Liberal pre-Fascist constitutional traditions were potentially available, but evidently could not solve the challenges faced. The Constituent Assembly elaborated the final document under a cloud of uncertainty: what next? Its members were forced to focus on the (imagined) future more than on present aims and objectives -opening the ground for a virtuous and vital compromise across political, ideological and philosophical divides. 17 Unlike in Japan and (to a lesser extent) West Germany, the Anglo-American allies left the constitutional process for the Italians to deal with. 18 The future was up for grabs. Our specific aim is to analyse the Catholic contribution to the Italian Constitution. In this context we discuss what we have elsewhere tried to capture as the Catholic 'appropriation of modernity'. 19 Scholars often insist that Christian Democracy, especially in its Catholic-Italian version, represented no real tradition of political thought, but was merely a means toward establishing strong ruling parties. 20 This judgement might be affected by the undeniable dullness of Christian Democratic politicians; but more likely it is explained by the fact that scholars never took Christian Democracy seriously as a political idea. 21 In Italy this perception was reinforced by revelations about Tangentopoli ('Bribesville', a metaphor for a huge corruption scandal uncovered in the early 1990s). To be sure, the Cold War, American financial and political support, and the 'occupation' of the Italian state by Christian Democracy were important in ensuring its hold on power from the end of the Second World War until 1994. Yet, the role of ideas cannot be easily dismissed. At the end of the war, a reliable ideological body had to emerge against the background of Fascism. From a Catholic perspective, this body had to appear as authentically universal without succumbing to Church dogma, yet present itself as particularly Italian. Thus Christian Democrats produced a profusion of ideas conducive to the adapting of Italian Catholicism to the standards of a modern democracy and a fairly advanced welfare state. To engage with Catholic contributions to the Constitution therefore means engaging with a crucial chapter of Italian history and politics. We argue that Catholic thought and social philosophy had a direct impact on political life -clearly visible in the drafting of the Constitution; this, in turn, indexes how Catholic ideas sought to interpret and give direction to the very idea of political modernity. The specific argument therefore pertains to a larger theoretical discussion concerning modernity and 'multiple modernities'. 22 The model for an ideal society cherished by young Catholic intellectuals was inspired by Christianity, but it was also rooted in the analysis of class dynamics and of existing social groups in Italy, and in an understanding of its political and institutional life. What was needed, apart from the theoretical and spiritual input, was to 'ascertain how persons and groups could be concretely engaged in the social and political dynamic'. 23 After an introduction about the 'premise on the spiritual foundation of the social life', the Code focused on State, Family, Education, Work, Production and Exchange, Economic Activity, and International Life. 24 In a sense, the Code established the framework of a government programme. It affirmed the necessity of state intervention in the economy, consciously indicating a 'third way' beyond pure market capitalism and state socialism, half a century before the Giddens-Blair ticket. It also pleaded for a decentralized almost federalist organization of the State, based on strong local autonomy. An essential characteristic was the identification of solidarity and social justice as primary aims of the State on a par with safeguarding freedom.
FROM CAMALDOLI TO THE CONSTITUTION
Sergio Paronetto (1911-45), probably the major contributor to the Code, advocated the need to concentrate upon the historical contingency. With great independence from Catholic social teaching, he believed that socioeconomic issues must be measured and dealt with on their own inherent terms -albeit firmly grounded in a Christian conscience and a spirituality shaped by the 'ascetic of the man of action'. 25 Paronetto refrained from direct engagement with party-political activities. However in the elaboration of the 1943 Reconstructive Ideas of Christian Democracy -the document that laid down the party's organizational-intellectual foundations -he cooperated with Alcide De Gasperi (1881-1954), who was to be the first Prime Minister of Italy (1945-54) to publicly profess himself Catholic. It is also for this reason that the Camaldoli Code gave momentum to Christian Democratic dynamic reformism as it developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and supported Catholic participation in the writing of the Constitution. 26 POSTWAR DELIBERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE 'DOSSETTIANI' Catholic debate on the new Constitution continued with even more energy in the months following the end of the war. 27 For example, the nineteenth 'social week of Italian Catholics', held in Florence in October 1945, dealt directly with 'Constitution and Constituent Assembly'. 28 Quite crucially, a group of left-leaning Christian Democratic thinkers and politicians became involved in the drafting of the Constitution, sitting on the board appointed to draw up the new charter. Giuseppe Dossetti (1913-96) , a young Canon Law professor from the Catholic University in Milan, and Giorgio La Pira (1904-77), one of the 'friends of Camaldoli', later to become mayor of Florence, were the most prominent figures in this group of intellectuals, often called, not without sarcasm, the professorini (young, fledgeling professors), or also the dossettiani. The movement Civitas Humana (founded in 1946) and the journal Cronache Sociali (1947-51) provided a platform for articulation of the group's ideals and plans for the institutional, social, and economic design of postwar Italy. 29 Dossetti had fought in the Resistance and served on the Committee of National Liberation. 30 In 1945 he was made vice-secretary of Christian Democracy and tried to open the party to pacifist and even socialist ideas. He had been deeply impressed by the Labour Party's 1945 election victory in Britain. 31 He and his circle of friends and collaborators became enthusiastic admirers of Stafford Cripps's Christian Socialism and engaged with John Maynard Keynes and William Henry Beveridge, whom they mistakenly took for Labour politicians.
32 La Pira drew extensively on Keynes, Lord Beveridge, the Economist, and Jesus Christ, collectively seen as the ultimate economic and spiritual points of reference. In 1950 he published two articles in which he explained the relevance of Keynes for postwar Italy, arguing that his economic policy was in tune with the Gospels. 33 Formed in the 1930s, in the intellectual climate of the UniversitaC attolica, Milan (at that time engaged in a harsh controversy with the Idealist conception of the Ethical State developed by the leading Fascist philosopher Giovanni Gentile), the professorini were also fascinated by French legal-social currents of thinking, including authors such as Le´on Duguit, Maurice Hauriou and Georges Gurvitch, not to mention the 'institutional' ideas of the Italian constitutionalist, Santi Romano, who had always shown a special concern with the need for legislation to be based on social reality. 34 During the 1930s Dossetti and many other future dossettiani had flirted with Fascism, which they considered at the time to be the best available model for the preservation of Catholic values. Yet with the increasing association of Fascism with Nazism and its racial policies, Dossetti drifted away from traditional Catholic intransigence and 'romanita`', still advocated in 1940 by the founder of the Universita`Cattolica Agostino Gemelli (1878-1959). 35 Strongly influenced by the experience of war, Dossetti, like other Catholics around him, began searching for a Catholic response to the challenge of modern mass politics. His aim was to bring the Church into alliance with the modern world. Dossetti saw that it was necessary to take a stance and become directly involved in active politics, first by fighting in the Resistance alongside communists and socialists, and later by active militancy in Christian Democracy. At the intellectual level, developing a Catholic response to the challenges of modern society meant bringing into the new democratic culture of postwar Italy the ideas which the dossettiani had avidly read and carefully reflected upon in the 1930s -those of European Catholic thinkers who had led the way in embracing crucial aspects of modernity and human rights as indispensable to a proper Catholic view of the world. This is important to understand. At the political-institutional level the interwar years were disastrous for political Catholicism, in Italy as well as in Germany and in other European countries. 36 However, Catholic thought had not come to a standstill, developing in fact as a meditation on the failures and setbacks of the interwar period. At the end of the war, Italian Catholic politicians found inspiration from across the Alps. A central figure in the debates remained the French philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882 Maritain ( -1973 MARITAIN: THE CATHOLIC GROUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC ORDER IN THE HUMAN 'PERSON' Maritain had been close to the quasi-fascist Action Franc¸aise in the 1920s but abandoned the movement when it was condemned by the Vatican in 1926. 37 Working in a neo-Thomist philosophical framework, in the 1930s he started to embrace human rights and modern democracy. In particular, his 1936 study Humanisme Inte´grale and his 1942 pamphlet Christianisme et de´mocratie -which was dropped by Allied planes over Europe in 1943 -had constituted a decisive assertion of the ultimately Christian nature of democracy.
It would be wrong to reduce this development to the French context. What slowly took shape during the 1930s happened in a transnational dialogue. As discussed by Samuel Moyn, also with reference to the work of James Chappel, the idea of the human person as the bearer of 'constitutional dignity' can be traced back to the Irish constitution of 1937. A hugely influential document here was Pius XI's 1937 papal encyclical Divini redemptoris, which declared the fundamental dignity of the human person. The encyclical was a rebuttal of the secular narrative of 'rights' and dignity bestowed upon the 'depersonalized individual' running from the French Revolution, and taken to extremes by the Communist regimes. Divini redemptoris is in fact a scathing attack on Communism. 38 However, in the Italian context there is no doubt that French developments were of primary importance, and Maritain's ideas were the ones with the most direct influence. Central to Maritain's theory and definition of democracy was the concept of the 'person' as opposed to the 'individual'. The 'person' has a spiritual and transcendent nature, irreducible to biology, and a concern for the good of all. It flourishes only within community and in relation with God -and, through God, with the good of all.
Maritain's writing influenced the emerging philosophy of 'communitarian personalism', and for a while Maritain acted as a mentor to its leading proponent Emmanuel Mounier (1905-50) . 39 During the 1930s Mounier and the group around the journal Esprit condemned both Communism and liberal individualism as forms of materialism. Liberal individualism, in particular, was held responsible for what Mounier disdained as 'le de´so-rdre e´tabli' (established disorder), his designation for the corrupt parliamentary politics of the French Third Republic and for a political culture associated with the heritage of the French revolution; as he put it, 'on the altar of this sad world, there is but one god, smiling and hideous: the Bourgeois'. 40 As an alternative to the materialist twins of liberalism and Communism, Mounier insisted that the 'person', as opposed to the isolated 'individual', always realized him/herself in a community, while retaining a spiritual dimension that could never be absorbed into the politics of this world. At the practical level, Mounier and the personalists endorsed a society with a vigorous group life (not unlike the English pluralists), and characterized by the decentralization of the decision-making process to the grassroots or to communities with a human dimension. Mounier's actual proposals were perhaps harmless. However, his rhetoric and expectations were revolutionary and hotly anti-liberal. Thus, he could briefly see room for the personalists in the Vichy regime during the war, and in Communism and Soviet Marxism after the war. Both Maritain and Mounier were in fact not necessarily in favour of founding explicitly Christian parties; rather, as Maritain repeated time and again, Christianity should be something like the 'yeast' of political life, making the liberation from pagan Fascism the first step to a new political culture based on moral and, to some degree, religious argument. 43 'The question', Maritain wrote, 'does not deal . . . with Christianity as a religious creed and road to eternal life, but rather with Christianity as leaven in the social and political life of nations and as bearer of the temporal hope of mankind . . . as historical energy at work in the world.' 44 In 1934, intervening in a fracas between Mounier and Catholic philosopher Paul Archambault, Maritain insisted that the new Christianity could not be equated with a party programme, being 'of a freer and more elevated order, which on the contrary seeks to renew the very manner of posing the problem'. Integral humanism 'could not be reduced to any of the operative ideologies in the political formation due to the nineteenth century and still extant'. 45 Even more harshly -given his view on man, God and the worldMounier, who had next to nothing to do with the drafting of the UNDHR, could not accept Christian Democracy; in fact he disliked Christian Democracy as a party project both in France in the 1930s, and in the postwar era. Elections, party politics, and coalition governments -he thought -meant compromise and consequently corruption. His 'democratic' credentials should not be overstated; actually his anti-liberalism sometimes bordered on anti-democratism. 46 In this, as on a whole range of issues, he characteristically adopted ambivalent positions. He strongly affirmed the existence of transcended truth, but refused to grant absolute validity to any particular human expression of that truth. Thus Mounier shared with his mentor, Charles Pe´guy (1873-1914), the desire to incarnate the spiritual in the temporal; he also believed, like the Christian Democrats, in 'engagement'. Yet Mounier also spoke warningly of the 'temptation to political action', and wrote in one of his essays in the early years of Esprit: 'Is not any action condemned to inefficacy to the extent that it will be pure, impure to the extent that it will be efficacious?' 47 He was caught firmly on the horns of this dilemma throughout his political career as editor of Esprit. His conviction that Christians must be in but not of the world forced him to walk his theological-philosophical tightrope publicly. He was strongly anti-bourgeois but found himself co-operating with bourgeois politicians during every major crisis of the thirties, from the Spanish Civil War to the Munich crisis and beyond. He consistently criticized the Christian Democrats as too clerical and confessional, yet his own faith kept him from an outright commitment to the Popular Front, which had to be content with a fraternal salute in 1936. His antagonist Paul Archambault accused him of imprecision, complete repudiation of capitalism, and doctrinal incoherence. For Mounier, then and later, the Christian Democrats were compromised by the liberal established disorder of the Third and Fourth Republics. He was consistently severe with regard to 'Christian Democratism', its inadequacies and its dishonest compromises. The question is: can one make a temporal commitment, especially one to radical anti-capitalism, without being involved in the established disorder?
FRENCH CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY GOES TO ITALY Without ridding itself of all of its open-ended questions and unresolved tensions, the thinking of Maritain and Mounier came to constitute an important reference point for Christian Democrats in Europe and in Italyincluding De Gasperi (first secretary of Democrazia Cristiana and postwar Prime Minister) and the professorini. They adopted the language of personalism as theirs as they became involved in the constitutional process. 48 In line with this French influence, the professorini criticized individualistic liberalism and instead saw the person as deeply embedded in a moral community. They located their role and their analytical-moral effort in the larger context of political modernity and where it had gone wrong. They were driven by the idea of 'transcending the principles of 1789', as La Pira once put it. 49 Or, as La Pira declared when commenting on the Constitution a few weeks after it took effect, 'the human personality unfolds through organic belonging to the successive social communities in which it is contained and via which it steadily develops and perfects itself'. 50 La Pira was one of the experts on the principles of civil relations sitting on the board appointed to draw up the Constitution. Harking back to the nineteenth-century critic Hippolyte Taine, he explicitly stated that Rousseau's 'individualistic' principles must be revised in a return to an 'organic' universe. La Pira quoted Mounier and his De´clarations des droits des personnes et des communaute´s, which was written in 1941 and debated at the height of the Resistance in the pages of Esprit under the questioning title: 'Should We Rewrite the Bill of Human Rights?' 51 The professorini were aiming at an Italian version of a labour-based 'integral' democracy, drawing on a holistic vision of the human person which could realize a Christian-inspired solidarity throughout Italian society and its institutional ramifications. Democracy could not have the 'empty' individual as the basic building block. Likewise, the economic order, based on market mechanisms, could not be justified with reference purely to economic principles, void of values. The economy had to be founded on the person; and the ultimate goal of economic development would always have to be referred back to the person and his or her fulfilment in a meaningful community (hence the slogan, 'First the person, then the market'). This idea was not easy to implement during the postwar period, in the general socioeconomic context of advancing capitalism and slowly unfolding consumerism based on the American way of life, exploding with the 'economic miracle' from the mid 1950s. 52 There were profound disagreements between Dossetti (and his group) and De Gasperi. 53 The dossettiani wanted a sharper distinction between 'Catholic' and 'political' action -or, as Maritain would have said, between the 'temporal' and the 'spiritual'. The party, they believed, must operate not only as an anti-Communist force -a generic public-opinion movement gathering consensus -but also as a centre of cultural elaboration and proponent of reformist political action. 54 Dossetti was to become more and more pessimistic about the possibility of Christian Democratic reformism. He was deeply dissatisfied with De Gasperi's government line which he openly criticized for lacking a serious social programme. He was appalled by Italy's NATO accession and by the government's aggressive attitude towards the East. 55 In 1951 he chose to dissolve his faction in the party and retired to monastic life -only to return for a while in 1956, when he ran unsuccessfully for mayor in the Communist stronghold Bologna. 56 Dossetti lost the belief that politics could be reformed from within. He became increasingly convinced that Italian politics could be reformed only on condition that the Church be reformed so that it could regain its leading role. This conviction pushed him to play an important role in the Second Vatican Council.
THE PROFESSORINI AND THE CONSTITUTION:
CATHOLICISM AT WORK Implementing Catholic philosophy in real life was never going to be an easy task. But as concerns the preparation and writing of the Constitution, the enterprise was largely successful. Let us briefly sum up where and how.
For a start, the professorini and the left-wing of Christian Democracy managed to have their version of the first Article of the Constitution passed: the 'personalist' wording 'Italy is a democratic Republic founded upon work' -elaborated and proposed by Amintore Fanfani, another of the professorini -prevailed over 'Italy is a democratic republic of workers' proposed by the Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti and supported by Socialists. 57 The difference may seem minimal at a first glance, but from the outset it steered the wording of the entire document away from a Socialist worldview.
Another formulation, in Article 2 -which makes a strong reference to the rights of man -can be traced to Catholic viewpoint and social philosophy:
The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inalienable rights of man, both as an individual and in the social orders wherein he develops his personality. The Republic demands the fulfilment of the binding duties of political, economic, and social solidarity.
The rights of man (and woman, we should now add) are legally proclaimed to be inviolable, but they are not suggested as 'sacred' and least of all as 'natural'. The professorini were not at all proposing a return to pre-modern legal thinking: they were applying Christian philosophy within the parameters of the modern episteme. As a matter of fact, the dossettiani agreed with the other founding fathers on the need to exclude meta-positive rights, those based on natural law. 58 Interpreters of the Italian Constitution have often neglected the fact that Part I of the Constitution recites the 'Rights and Duties of Citizens', much more similar to the Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919 (Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Deutschen) than to the French Declaration of 26 August 1789, entitled 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens'. 59 And it is quite clear that the 'rights' are immediately related to the social level, and to the 'duties' involved in the bringing about of social 'solidarity'. To use anachronistic terms, the wording is Communitarian rather than Liberal.
Article 3 in turn stated (states!) that 'It is the Republic's duty to remove obstacles of an economic and social order physically constricting the freedom and equality of citizens and thus impeding the full development of the human person'. Its concluding words -'and the effective participation of all workers in the political and social organization of the country' -confirmed the dossettiani's willingness to collaborate with socialists and communists in order to steer away from liberal individualism.
As should now be clear, then, the term 'person' in their usage implies a totally different meaning from that of 'individual' as employed in the liberal thinking which permeates most democratic constitutions. And this philosophical standpoint derives from the inspiration that sustains the whole document.
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE LETTER AND THE
SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION Thanks to the efforts of Dossetti -not least to his willingness and ability to develop a dialogue with socialists and communists -the Constitution enshrined not only the primacy of the human person as a part of a social union (that is also a spiritual union), but also the principle of freedom as a responsibility. The Catholic view of freedom was different, if not opposite, from the idea of freedom elaborated by most currents of modern Constitutionalism. Freedom could only be accepted as the positive freedom to uphold the common good. In close affinity with Togliatti and the communists, the very young follower of Dossetti, Aldo Moro (1916-78) , declared -during a meeting of the Constituent Assembly Subcommittee for the drafting of the Constitution -that 'liberty in a democratic system is one that aims not to permit individual free will to be attained, but the full expression of a person's values, as well as positive collaboration by individuals to achieve the common good'. 60 The debate concerned an Article for the Constitution proposed by La Pira -with the explicit aim of 'endowing liberty with a different meaning than the one underlying the 1789 Declaration' -which stated:
The liberties guaranteed by this Constitution must be implemented to perfect the human person, in tune with the demands of social solidarity and toward the improvement of democracy by means of an increasingly active and conscious participation of all in the common good. Hence liberty is the foundation of responsibility (1 October 1946). 61 This Article was not included in the final draft of the Constitution, despite the strong defence of it by Moro and Dossetti. Nevertheless, it is evident that the activism of Dossetti and the professorini was very influential in the discussions held by the drafting committee. There was much debate, for instance, over whether to include the right to 'resistance'. The draft of the Constitution included indeed an Article that read, 'the individual and collective resistance to oppression is a right and a duty of the citizen when the public powers violate the rights and fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Constitution'. This proposal followed a suggestion by Dossetti, and met with sharp opposition. 62 Over the course of the debate, the view which prevailed was that it was impossible to legally regulate something that was, by its nature, separate from the sphere of positive law, and the Article was not approved. 63 Liberty and equality, far from being tools for identifying rival ideologies, are mutually reconciled in the 'full human person's development' enshrined in Article 3, which is made the cutting edge of constitutional principles. Civil, political, social and economic rights are accordingly recognized and granted. Rights of the individual are granted in communities such as families, schools, unions, parties, churches. Social and political pluralism becomes part of the constitutional landscape, grounded in what Mounier had talked about as a 'communitarian personalism'.
The pluralistic philosophy expressed here shines through in other parts of the document. For example, the second part of the Constitution, concerning the Republic's institutional framework, articulates public power both as shared among diverse institutions at the central level (parliament, government, president of the Republic, referendum, judiciary and Constitutional court), and among the State and local authorities, including regions, provinces and municipalities. This articulation is more sophisticated than Montesquieu's separation of powers, reflecting not only the need for granting citizens' liberties, but also an essentially pluralistic view of democracy.
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER PERSPECTIVES Our initial conclusion can be easily stated. The wordings of the Constitution discussed above represented small but significant results of a battle over values and visions of modernity won by the dossettiani. It was certainly a symbolic victory for the professorini, and with a lasting effect. The professorini had sought and helped to build a post-liberal democracy, with distinct spiritual foundations. Moreover, the writing of the Constitution was the first political-cultural operation led by Catholic lay intellectuals and politicians without support from the Vatican. Christian Democracy achieved what political Catholicism had until then only been dreaming of: it regained a leading role in the modern world.
The wider perspectives to infer from this cannot here be fully elaborated, but let us at least sketch two dimensions involved that may prompt further theoretical reflection.
First, the Italian narrative is evidently not only an Italian story. The centrality of the 'person', a 'social' view of the economy, the defence of non-statal entities from the family to the Church, and the validation of forms of organization which were both political (parties) and corporative (trade unions): these were principles introduced via Christian Democracy not only in the Italian Constitution but also in European 'core' countries, France and West Germany. 64 This demonstrates that the received wisdom about Christian Democracy, that it should not be taken very seriously as an autonomous political philosophy with real-world agency, simply does not stand up to scrutiny.
The Catholic imprint on the Constitution happened just as Catholics, through Christian Democracy, were becoming the dominant political force of the new republican Italy, and central actors in the process of building a modern mass democracy and a welfare state. Christian Democracy was in postwar Italy, as in many other European countries, the central forum for institutionalizing Catholic modernity -a momentous turn in Italian and European history that in retrospect is easy to miss. And in this vein let us simply remark the fact that this very same philosophical baggage had no little influence on another group of founding fathers, namely those of the European community. 65 Granted the increasingly heated discussions over Europe's founding values, and the deepening crisis of European integration, this perhaps deserves slightly more attention than it currently gets. Second, the Christian Democratic political thought epitomized in the writings and reflections of Dossetti and the professorini was influential in a shift of attitude that took place in the postwar period, where the Church, and Catholicism writ large, came to endorse 'modernity', or perhaps better, became a 'partner' of modernity. However this change in orientation did not simply mean accepting and embracing modernity in its current shape. Nor did it mean, as implied by Dossetti's biographer Paolo Pombeni and uncritically carried forward in the analysis recently offered by Jan-Werner Mu¨ller, simply putting forward liberal values once again, couched in a different vocabulary, with only cosmetic reference to a set of different ideas. 66 On the contrary, it meant developing and resubstantiating the modern call to freedom from within a classical and Christian tradition, opening the way for an 'integral' or 'organic' or also 'evangelical' or 'spiritual' post-liberal democracy. Such wording may sound vague and inherently open to interpretation, and questions certainly abound concerning its political realization. But may not the same be said about liberal formulas? We are not here simply dealing with a thinly veiled liberalism, mere jargon which did not alter a quintessential liberal substance re-emerging triumphantly after the 'parenthesis' of Fascism. We are dealing indeed with an alternative vision and political model, one that developed as both a reflection on the misadventures of Fascism and a critique of classical liberalism. Dossetti hated liberalism; in a way, liberalism represented the most serious of historical enemies to a healthy social and political order, as he explained in an emblematic letter which he as partisan commander sent to the priests of the Appenines in March 1945. 67 It is only within this political-cum-epistemological horizon that we can understand the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Christian-Catholic philosophy was not just cosmetic, nor did it simply mark a transition towards the postwar liberal order. Quite the contrary: the Constitution closed the liminal period and -if we return to van Gennep's original terminologymarked the 'reaggregation', the constitution of a new, different order. It thus symbolized the successful closure of a double transition: from Monarchy to Republic and from Fascism to Democracy. It marked a new beginning, which was based on the historical compromise between Catholics, Socialists, Communists and other forces that had fought against Fascism -that is, it was rooted in the experience of the period of transition, 1943-5, and the anti-Fascist struggle. The 'transition' unfolded within the realm of empirical history; Christian Democracy/political Catholicism brought it to an end. Or, to put it even more simply: Christian Democracy is not an 'ideology of transition', as Jan-Werner Mu¨ller has asserted, 68 but an answer to transition. 
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